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THE GATT PANEL REPORT ON DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS:
ILLEGAL SUBSIDY UNDER THE GATT
The trade distortive effects of four nations' tax practices were
recently studied' by a panel of experts (the Panel)2 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GALT).3 The Panel reported that
the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) provisions
of the United States Internal Revenue Code (the Code)4 create an
export subsidy incompatible with Article XVI of the GATT. In
particular, the Panel determined that thdisc legislation confers
tax benefits upon domestic exporters which serve to increase
exports by attracting more resources to export activity. Such
benefits were found to constitute an export subsidy which nullifies
or impairs benefits that other contracting parties are entitled to
expect under the GATT.5
Description of the DISC Program
The DISC provisions were created by the Revenue Act of 19716
with the aim of stimulating the exportation of American goods.
Before the advent of the DISC legislation, it was felt that the tax
structure as it then existed contributed to the United States
balance-of-payments deficit by encouraging domestic corpora-
1. UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION (DISC), Report of the Panel,
GATI' DOC. L/4422 (2 November 1976) [hereinafter cited as Panel Report];
INCOME TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY FRANCE, Report of the Panel,
GATT DOC. L/4423 (2 November 1976); INCOME TAX PRACTICES MAIN-
TAINED BY BELGIUM, Report of the Panel, GATT DOC. L/4424 (2 November
1976); INCOME TAX PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY THE NETHERLANDS,
Report of the Panel, GATT DOC. L/4425 (2 November 1976).
2. The Panel was chaired by L. J. Mariadason, Counsellor of the Permanent
Mission of Sri Lanka, Geneva. The Panel members were W. Falconer, Director of
Trade Policy, Department of Trade and Industry; Wellington; F. Forte, Professor of
Public gfinance, University of Turin; T. Gabrielsson, Counsellor of Embassy,
Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the European Communities, Brussels; A. R.
Prest, Professor of Economics of the Public Sector, London School of Economics.
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5 at A-
11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (effective Jan. 1, 1948).
4. I.R.C. §§ 991-97.
5. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 15-17.
6. Pub. L. No. 92-178, Title V. § 501, 85 Stat. 535 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§§991-997 (Supp. II 1972)).
(387)
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tions to establish manufacturing subsidiaries in foreign coun-
tries. 7 By enacting the DISC incentive, the United States hoped to
induce domestic concerns to establish overseas markets and to
supply these markets with domestically manufactured goods.
This, in turn, would strengthen the balance of payments position
of the United States by increasing exports and eliminating, at
least to some degree, the financial advantages traditionally
associated with the creation of overseas manufacturing affiliates.8
Accordingly, the 1972 amendments provided that by establishing
a Domestic International Sales Corporation, a domestic manufact-
urer (parent corporation) could channel its export sales through a
DISC subsidiary, thereby entitling the domestic parent to the tax
advantages described more fully below.
To qualify for the tax benefits under DISC, a corporation is
required to confine its activities exclusively or almost exclusively
to the selling of goods for export and activities related thereto.
Specifically, the prospective DISC candidate must be a United
States corporation. Furthermore, 95% of the corporation's gross
receipts for each taxable year must be export-derived. 9 Finally, the
DISC must possess a minimum capitalization of US$2,500.10
Acquiring a DISC structure can create several significant tax
advantages for a company and its shareholders." First, one-half
of a DISC's earnings may be deferred until distribution to its
shareholders in the. form of dividends while the other half is
deemed distributed and taxed currently to the shareholders.12 This
7. Anninger, DISC and GATT: International Trade Aspects of Bringing
Deferral Home, 13 HARV. INT'L L. J. 391 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Anninger].
Before the enactment of the DISC provisions in 1972, U.S. corporations
were generally subject to tax on all income on a current basis, even if derived from
foreign trade or export, whereas foreign corporations were generally free from
United States tax on foreign-source income, even if owned by an American
company, until such profits were distributed to the domestic parent. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, ch. 1, §§951-64, 76 Stat. 1006 (1962).
8. Comment, DISC: A Tax Primer, 20 LOYOLA L. REV. 325 (1973-74).
9. I.R.C. § 992.
10. U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, DISC - A HANDBOOK FOR EXPORTERS
[hereinafter cited as DISC HANDBOOK]. In essence, a DISC is a subsidiary corpora-
tion of an American manufacturer designed to be no more than a conduit for
export earnings.
11. The corporation itself that qualifies as a DISC is not subject to U.S. federal
income tax on its current or retained export earnings. I.R.C. § 991; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.991-1(a) (1974).
12. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1). This deferral would end if the shareholder sold his DISC
stock or the corporation lost its DISC status. Id. § 995(c).
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postponement of tax results in cash being currently available to
the parent corporation for qualified uses, among which is the
effectuation of "producer's loans". 13 The parent corporation is
permitted to borrow income from a DISC in a five-year producer's
loan. This is an attractive provision, because the parent may
borrow funds from its DISC subsidiary essentially interest-free. 14
Moreover, producer's loans can be renewed indefinitely for five-
year periods, as long as certain conditions are met at the time of
each renewal.' 5
A second benefit available to the DISC involves the advan-
tages of intercompany pricing in the determination of a DISC's
income. Special intercompany price rules enable a DISC to earn
considerably more profit than it would under the arms length
pricing requirements normally applied in the case of parent and
subsidiary corporations.1 6 The result is that some profits of the
parent manufacturers can be shifted to the DISC subsidiary and
receive the preferential tax treatment. 17
Thus, it seems clear that by employing the DISC mechanism
a domestic producer can enjoy substantial tax advantages not
available to conventional exporters. 8 The Panel Report condemns
13. I.R.C. § 993(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4 (1974).
14. Such loans are interest-free assuming the interest is actually distributed as
a dividend by the DISC. "The reason for this is that the interest is not taxed to the
DISC and is a deduction for the borrower-shareholder and the dividend is taxed to
the borrower-shareholder." DISC HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 21; I.R.C.
§ 995(b)(1)(A).
15. DISC HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 20. The conditions which must be met
at each renewal are (1) the producer's loans may not exceed an amount determined
by multiplying the borrower's total United States plant, machinery, equipment,
inventory, and research and development expenditures by the percentage of the
borrower's export receipts to his total receipts; and (2) the borrower must increase
his investment in the year in which the loan is made in United States assets listed
above or in research and development. Id. at 21-22; I.R.C. § 995(b).
16. See I.R.C. § 482 for the normal arms length pricing requirements. The two
"safe-haven" rules of I.R.C. § 994 enable a DISC to earn on its sales of export
property either 4% of the qualified export receipts on the sale, or 50% of the
combined taxable income of the DISC and its related manufacturer from the sale of
export property, whichever is greater, plus, in either case, 10% of export promotion
expenses. For industries with low rates of return on sales, the 4% of sales rules will
permit all profits on the transaction to be attributed to the DISC. The 50% rule,
which comes into effect when the profit rate on sales is above 8%, is also intended
to produce a result more generous than present arms length pricing rules.
17. For examples of applications of these rules, see Treas. Reg. § 1.994-1 (1974).
18. One commentator has calculated that taking into account both the 50%
deferral and the intercompany pricing rules, utilization of the DISC provisions
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this preferential treatment as a violation of Article XVI of the
GATT.
GATT Provisions
The GATT was established in 1946 to give substantive form to
the basic principles of free international trade by imposing legal
obligations on the contracting parties. Tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade, as well as other governmental distortions of the
free flow of goods and services were to be eliminated, thereby
allowing international trade to flow in an "undistorted" pattern.19
One form of non-tariff barrier to free trade which the GATT
seeks to minimize is the export subsidy, which has been
considered more trade-distortive than either tariffs or domestic
subsidies:
The difference in treatment of import and export
hindrances to trade is part of a notion evident throughout the
General Agreement that a country has a greater right to
interfere with its own domestic markets than with markets of
other countries. Artificially reducing imports by tariffs or
domestic subsidies is regarded as more acceptable than
artificially increasing exports by means of export subsidies,
domestic subsidies, or dumping.2°
makes it possible to reduce current federal income taxes on the manufacture and
sale of export products generally from 48% to 36% and, in certain cases, to as low as
24%. Anninger, supra note 7, at 400. For example, for a manufacturer whose
normal rate of return on export sales is 4% or less, the special intercompany pricing
rules of § 994 enable attribution of all profits on the transaction to the DISC. Thus,
inasmuch as only 50% of the DISC income is deemed distributed, the parent pres-
ently incurs an effective tax rate of 24% on the gain from the entire transaction
(manufacture and sale). Id.
19. R. BALDwIN, NoNrARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as BALDWIN]; G. HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 321-22 (1936).
20. BALDWIN, supra note 19, at 47 and n.44. See generally, K. DAM, THE GATT
- LAW AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMic ORGANIZATION 132-135 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as DAM], where it is noted that the GAT' provisions are designed to be
hostile to subsidies, and the reasoning behind those provisions is questioned. Dam
proposes that since tariffs are considered lawful for protection purposes, subsidies,
or at least production subsidies designed to permit local industry to compete with
imports in the local market, should also be considered lawful for protection, and
that they may, in fact, be more compatible with a free trade ideology than would be
a tariff. See also Anninger, supra note 7, at 395.
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Reflecting this philosophy, GATT Article XVI(1) sets forth the
obligations imposed upon countries maintaining export subsi-
dies,21 while Article XVI(4) upon which the Panel based its
findings enumerates certain types of prohibited export subsidies.
Article XVI(4) states in part:
[C]ontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or
indirectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product
other than a primary product which subsidy results in the
sale of such product for export at a price lower than the
comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the
domestic market.
The prohibitory language of Article XVI(4) thus comes into effect
upon the coexistence of two elements: (1) the governmental
program must be an export subsidy of a nonprimary product,22
and (2) this export subsidy must be found to result in the sale of
21. Art. XVI(1) requires that any contracting party granting or maintaining a
subsidy which directly or indirectly increases exports of any product from, or
reduces imports of any product into, its territorq is to notify the CONTRACTING
PARTIES (i.e., the GATT parties as a group) of the extent and nature of the
subsidization, an estimate of its effect, and the circumstances making the
subsidization necessary. Thus, one effect of the Panel's determination that the
DISC system constitutes an export subsidy is that the notification obligations of
Art. XVI(1) become effective upon the United States.
Some commentators have voiced skepticism with regard to the likelihood
of compliance with such notification requirements, in that such information
disclosed by the subsidizing country could later be the basis for imposition of
countervailing duties. See Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization:
A Re-emerging Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 94 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Butler]. See Comment, The DISC Legislation as a Violation of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 41 Mo. L. REV. 180, 182-85 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Comment]. See also DAM, supra note 20, at 146, for a
discussion of the notification requirements as they apply to primary and
nonprimary products.
22. A primary product is "any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any
mineral in its natural form or which has undergone such process as is customarily
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade."
GATT, Annex I, Ad Art. XVI sec. B(2). Such a distinction between primary and
nonprimary products has been regarded us stemming from the desire of many
governments to use subsidies or their equivalent to protect their farmers from
market price fluctuations. DAM, supra note 20, at 134. Most DISC's concern
themselves with the export of nonprimary products. In fact, the legislative history
of the DISC provisions indicates that its emphasis was in the area of increasing
the export of manufactured goods and that primary product producers showed
little interest in the passage of DISC. Anninger, supra note 7, at 401-02.
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such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market.2 3
The Panel's study focused on the first of these elements, and
addressed the longstanding problem of determining what practi-
ces do or do not constitute a subsidy.24
The GAIT does not specifically define the term "subsidy."
Apparently, this is because there was a fear among the drafters of
the agreement that a comprehensive definition would inevitably
be construed to include practices not intended 'by the contracting
parties to be subject to the restrictions imposed by Article XVI.25
However, there is language in Article XVI(i) indicating that the
term is to be given an expansive meaning. That provision
describes a subsidy as a practice "which operates directly or,
indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or reduce
imports of any product into, its territory.. "26 One commentator
has recently stated that a subsidy occurs whenever exporters are
singled out for assistance, for the purpose of promoting exports, at
the expense of government. 27
Attempts have been made to apply these vague conceptions of
a subsidy to concrete situations. The interpretive notes to Article
XVI delineate certain measures that are not to be regarded as.
subsidies. 28 More pertinent to the present inquiry, however, is a
1960 working party report containing a list (1960 list) of other
measures which are generally to be regarded as subsidies by the
governments adopting the 1960 declaration promulgated pursuant
23. This second element is referred to as the "price differential clause." The
reason for the inclusion of such clause in Article XVI is not clear. See Anninger,
supra note 7, at 408-09.
24. Of course, direct payments to exporters upon shipment of goods abroad is
the clearest example of aid to exports through subsidy. However, such direct
subsidies are infrequently used because other trading nations would be likely to
respond with the imposition of countervailing duties on the subsidized products.
See Butler, supra note 21, at 102.
25. See GATT, 10th Supp. BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
208 (1962) L [hereinafter cited as BISD]. See generally, Evans, Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties in the GATT: Present Law and Future Prospects, 3 INT'L;
TRADE L. J. 211 (1977).
26. GATT, 3d Supp. BISD 222, 224-27 (1955).
27. Anninger, supra note 7, at 405-06.
28. GAIT, Annex I, Ad Art. XVI provides:
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like
product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such
duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not
be deemed to be a subsidy.
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to that report.29 Two of the items in this list of "forbidden
practices" are of particular importance for the purpose of DISC,
viz., tax rebates (item (c)) and exemptions (item (d)). Item (c)
classifies as a subsidy the "remission, calculated in relation to
exports, of direct taxes.. . ."-0 This most likely refers to a refund
29. Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI(4) of GATT, 19
November 1960. [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2605, T.I.A.S. No. 5227, 445 U.N.T.S. 318 (signed by
17 developed nations, including the United States, which signed with a reservation
as to primary-product export subsidies). The practices "generally considered as
subsidies" by the governments accepting the 1960 declaration are:
a. Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a
bonus on exports or re-exports;
b. The provision by governments of direct subsidies to exporters;
c. The remission, calculated in relation to exports of direct taxes or social
welfare charges on industrial or commercial enterprises;
d. The exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or taxes, other
than charges in connection with importation or indirect taxes levied at one or
several stages on the same goods if sold for internal consumption; or the
payment, in respect of exported goods, of amounts exceeding those effectively
levied at one or several stages on these goods in the form of indirect taxes or of
charges in connection with importation or in both forms;
e. In respect of deliveries by governments or governmental agencies of
imported raw materials for export business on different terms than for
domestic business, the charging of prices below world prices;
f. In respect of government export credit guarantees, the charging of
premiums at rates which are manifestly inadequate to cover the long-term
operating costs and losses of the credit insurance institutions;
g. The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by
governments) of export credits at rates below those which they have to pay in
order to obtain the funds so employed;
h. The government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by exporters
in obtaining credit.
GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 186-87 (1961).
30. A distinction is drawn between "direct" and "indirect" taxes. Direct taxes
are those levied upon the income derived from the production and sale of the
product (as is the income tax in the United States). Indirect taxes, on the other
hand, are those levied on the transfer of the product such as a sales tax or turnover
tax. The distinction was originally drafted into the GATT, because at that time,
most economists made the assumption that indirect taxes are fully passed on to the
consumer, while direct taxes are absorbed by the seller and not reflected in the
purchase price. Consequently, under this reasoning, it was felt that an exemption
or remission of a direct tax would constitute a subsidy in favor of the seller, thus
frustrating the purpose of GAIT. On the other hand, an exemption or remission of
an indirect tax to the seller would operate in favor of the foreign consumer in the
form of lower prices and not aid the seller. See Comment, supra note 21, at 193.
This, in essence, allows member countries to relieve exports of indirect taxes as
they leave the country, and to impose on imports a tax equal to that borne by the
like domestic product. The United States is one of the few countries which depends
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of all or part of a tax already assessed or paid, 31 and thus does not
fall within the DISC provisions. However, as the aforegoing
examination of the mechanics of the DISC system has shown,
item (d), the "exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges
or taxes . . ." arguably comes close to falling within the DISC
deferral system, as, at some point in time, a deferral may be
effectively equivalent to an exemption. This is, in fact, the precise
conclusion reached in the Panel Report.
Panel Conclusions
The representatives of the European Economic Community
(EEC) contended before the Panel that the DISC legislation
conflicted with the provisions of Article XVI(4), that a prima facie
case of nullification and impairment existed, and that the
interests of a number of contracting parties had been seriously
prejudiced. The Panel accepted this conclusion, resting their
determination on several aspects of the DISC provisions.
The Panel determined that the DISC tax deferral provisions
violated Article XVI(4). The Panel adopted the adage "taxes
delayed are taxes saved", although the members were not totally
convinced that a deferral, simply because it is given for an
indeterminate period, is equal to a remission or exemption in
violation of items (c) and (d) of the 1960 list.32 In addition, the
almost entirely on direct taxes, such as the income tax, as its revenue source. Thus,
foreign exporters, in countries where indirect taxes are a primary revenue source,
are able to receive tax "subsidies" on exportation far greater than can the United
States. See Marks and Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 351 et seq. (1975).
The economic distinction between direct and indirect taxes has come under
much criticism, mostly justified. See Comment, supra note 21, at 193; DAM, supra
note 20, at 214-15. The Panel avoided the issue altogether, stating that "the extent
to which direct and indirect charges were shifted on to prices was a particularly
complex problem on which the Working Party had not reached unanimous views."
Panel Report, supra note 1, at 13.
31. Anninger, supra note 7, at 403.
32. Other commentators have been more insistent in their determinations that
the fact that producer's loans can be indefinitely renewed effectively makes the tax
liability non-existent and clearly amounts to a subsidy on export production. See
Anninger, supra note 7, at 404, wherein he states that the DISC deferral feature is
most accurately described as a tax exemption, and quotes from statements made
during the Congressional hearings on the DISC:
But even indefinite deferral is not required. For a profitable company the pres-
ent value of fifteen years deferral of tax is just about worth the amount of the
tax itself - which makes deferral the equivalent of exemption. The reason is
394
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Panel noted that the DISC legislation provides for the termination
of the deferral under specified circumstances. The Panel further
noted, however, that the deferral did not attract the interest
component of the tax normally levied for late or deferred payment
and therefore concluded that, to this extent, the DISC legislation
constituted a partial exemption which was covered by one or both
of paragraphs (c) and (d) of the illustrative list.33
The United States representative argued unsuccessfully that,
strictly speaking, GAT does not prohibit deferral of taxes as
such, but that only outright rebates and exemptions are forbid-
den.34 The representative noted that the only official action taken
by the Contracting Parties to define subsidies was the adoption of
the 1960 list. Remission and exemption were expressly included in
the list, he argued, however, the Working Party report made no
mention of tax deferral, tax exemption for foreign source income,
or other more complex direct tax practices. He argued that the
illustrative list did not cover the DISC system since the latter was
a mere deferral and not a remission or exemption, cancellation,
release or forgiveness of direct taxes calculated in respect of
exports.35 The Panel flatly rejected this notion, finding that in
economic terms there was little distinction.
that the deferred tax money that a company keeps over such a period (in effect
an interest-free loan for that period) can be put to work earning additional
money.
Statement of S. Surrey, Hearings on H.R. 10947 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Seas., pt. 2, at 729 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Surrey].
Numerous other commentators on the subject have concluded that the deferral
system is an exemption due to the potentially perpetual deferral. See Comment,
supra note 21, at 194, for a collection of these authorities.
33. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 15. The representative of the European
Communities had argued that even if tax deferral were to end sometime, either in
exceptional circumstances or through the elimination of the DISC system, there
would still be an exemption of the compound interest on the deferred tax. Id. at 17.
34. This was one of the Treasury Department's arguments when it initially
presented the DISC legislation. See Letter from Roy T. Englert to Hon. Wilbur D.
Mills, June 16, 1970, reprinted in Anninger, supra note 7, at 393, n.12.
35. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 7. Though perhaps an appealing argument,
it loses much of its cogency when it is considered that the present value to a
corporation of 15 years of tax deferral is approximately equal to the tax itself. See
Surrey, supra note 32, at 733. The U.S. representative conceded that a deferral
could have the same economic effect as an exemption if the deferral extended for a
sufficiently long period of time. Panel Report, supra at 7. However, he maintained
that the benefits of the DISC legislation were sufficiently uncertain as to duration
and amount to negate any analogy to remission or exemption of taxes. One reason
for this was that continued deferral depended on a company's ability to qualify as
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The Panel also found fault with DISC's intercompany pricing
provisions, in that, given the various options under the DISC
legislation for the allocation of profits from export sales between
parent manufacturers and DISC's, there was too much leeway for
the parent company to influence the size of the exemption. 36 The
Panel thus implicitly rejected the argument of the United States
delegate who contended that the DISC legislation had brought its
intercompany pricing rules more closely into line with those of
other countries with respect to exports, and that the treatment of
export sales income allowed under tax practices in many
European countries was substantially equivalent to, and in many
cases more favorable than that provided by the DISC provisions.3 7
The United States representative also argued the propriety of
DISC as a compensatory export subsidy which works to rectify
pre-existing distortions in international competitive conditions
created by the tax practices of certain other contracting parties.38
The Panel concluded, however, that one distortion could not be
justified by the existence of another one. It noted that if the
United States had determined that other contracting parties were
violating the General Agreement, it could have had recourse to the
remedies set out in the GAJ7. 39 The Panel also remarked that the
a DISC for each taxable year. He also stated that it was often difficult to meet the
95% qualified export assets test, that the most useful assets in this regard were the
trade receivables generated on export sales of the parent of the DISC, but that the
ability to use these depended upon exports growing at an increasingly rapid rate.
Id.
36. Id. at 16. The European Communities had argued that the 4% and 50%
rules of thumb, see note 16, supra, were inconsistent with the arm's length
principle under which profits are allocated to different, even if closely related,
entities by reference to conditions of fully effective competition. Id. at 8.
37. Id. The United States representative argued that the DISC legislation in
most cases established a 75-25 allocation of profits between those currently
taxable and those subject to tax deferral, while some GATT party nations provided
for a 50-50 allocation of profits between those taxable and those subject to
complete exemption.
38. Id. at 9. The obvious implication of such an argument is "if they can do it,
we can do it." Anninger, supra note 7, at 419. For the European Communities'
response to the U.S. representative's argument, see Panel Report, supra note 1, at
10-11.
39. Id. at 17. See also Anninger, supra note 7, at 420, where he indicates that to
the extent that the DISC system does compensate for the distortions caused by
other countries' tax practices, it invites retaliation in the form of either offsetting
countervailing duties or competitive export subsidies. To this extent, DISC could
precipitate a spiraling of trade restrictions.
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fact that tax practices of certain other countries had been in force
for some time without being the subject of complaints was not, in
itself, conclusive evidence that there was a consensus that they
were compatible with the General Agreement. 40
Having determined that the DISC legislation constitutes an
export subsidy in terms of the 1960 list, the Panel noted that the
contracting parties who had accepted the 1960 Declaration had
agreed that the practices in the illustrative list were generally
considered to be subsidies in the sense of Article XVI(4). 41 That is,
the practices contained in the illustrative list could be presumed to
result in bi-level pricing, thereby violating the price-differential
element of Article XVI(4).42 This presumption could therefore be
applied to the DISC legislation, making it a violation of Article
XVI. 4 3
The Panel thus rejected the United States arguments in
defense of the legality of the DISC system in light of the GATT,
and determined that there was a prima facie case of nullification
or impairment of benefits which other contracting parties were
entitled to expect under the General Agreement. 44
Effect of the Panel Report on the U.S. DISC Program
At the present time, the possible repercussions of the Panel's
determinations on United States tax law would be purely
speculative. Although the GATT has never been submitted to the
Senate for ratification, it is valid and enforceable in the United
States as an executive agreement, as long as it is not in conflict
with any domestic legislation. 45
40. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 17.
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. At least one author agrees. See Anninger, supra note 7, at 407.
43. The Panel did conclude, however, from the descriptive words heading the
list, "generally to be considered," that the CONTRACTING PARTIES did not
consider the presumption absolute. Panel Report, supra note 1, at 16. It is
interesting to note that if the DISC provisions had not been found to fit into items
(c) or (d) of the forbidden practices list, thus triggering the presumption, the price
differential test for bi-level pricing would have had to be confronted and satisfied
before DISC could be condemned as a violation of Article XVI. The Working
Party's conclusion that the presumption was triggered obviated the arguments of
the United States and European Communities as to who had the burden of
producing the price differential data. See Panel Report, supra note 1, at 12-13.
44. Id. at 17.
45. For a thorough discussion of the status of the GATT as domestic law, see
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the United States
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The GATT itself does not contain any punitive or enforcement
provisions to be applied to contracting parties who choose to
violate its provisions. 46 Rather, individual self-help in the form of
retaliation has been left to the contracting parties as the most
functional remedy. 47 Contracting parties who perceive themselves
as victims of the DISC system may feel compelled to avail
themselves of such retaliatory measures, promoting a chain
reaction which would result in the erection of a myriad of
defensive trade barriers. 48 Not only would these retaliatory acts
undermine the purpose of the GATT, but such actions by other
nations would also operate to defeat the purpose for which the
DISC system was designed. 49
This is not to suggest that prompt repeal of the DISC
legislation is either mandatory or in the offing.w° In light of the
Panel's similar condemnation of the tax practices of other
European nations,5 ' and the generally acknowledged questionable
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1967). It should be noted that executive
agreements are a valuable tool of international relations which cannot be lightly
disregarded by Congress.
46. Cf. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J.
WoRLD TRADE L. 615, 624, 627 (1970).
47. DAM, supra note 20, at 81. Although restrictive tariffs are perhaps the most
well-known retaliatory impediment to a violating country's products, many non-
tariff trade barriers could conceivably be implemented. For example, quantitative
restrictions on imports are considered the most effective, although perhaps the
most cumbersome to administer. Metzger, Non-Tariff Trade Barriers: New
Liberalization or New Protectionism?, 63 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L Pxoc. 203 (1969).
Other conceivable non-tariff retaliatory measures would be the use of anti-dumping
or countervailing duties, manipulation of size and quality controls, tax incentives
for exporters, artificially high valuations of imports for customers' purposes, and
"buy national" programs for government procurement.
48. Comment, supra note 21, at 198.
49. Id.
50. In early January 1977, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Al
Ullman stated that the DISC provisions "probably will stay until we get
something else to take its place." [1977] U.S. EXPORT WKLY. BNA No. 140 at A-2
(Feb. 1, 1977). He also noted that any comprehensive tax revision hearings
probably would not be held until the end of 1977, with mark-up sessions following
in early 1978. Id.
51. The tax practices of the Netherlands, France and Belgium differ from the
DISC provisions in that these countries employ a system of levying income and
corporate tax whereby profits made by an individual or corporation are taxed in
the country where the profits were made. Thus a domestic manufacturing firm
which channels its sales through its foreign branches or foreign sales subsidiaries
will not be subject to tax on that export sales income, regardless of whether the
398
THE GATT PANEL REPORT
practices of other contracting parties, unilateral United States
abolition of DISC may not be the most prudent course. Perhaps
the United States should use DISC abolition as a negotiating chip
in its efforts to secure modifications of other countries' export
incentives.5 2 Rather than unilateral abandonment, such a stra-
tegy may unwind the spiral of trade barriers and bring the
contracting parties closer to the free trade principles underlying
the General Agreement.
J. Michael McGuire
foreign country makes use of its taxation rights. In this manner, foreign income
which includes the sales element on exports would not be taxed by the home
country, arguably resulting in a remission or exemption of taxes. The Working
Party determined that these taxing systems create a distortion in conditions of
international competition in that they afford a remission or exemption of direct
taxes in violation of those countries' commitments as contracting parties, under
GATT Art. XVI(4). See the Panel Reports cited supra note 1.
52. The GATT Council, which in the past has usually approved GATT panel
findings, has postponed final decision several times on the Panel's examination of
DISC, primarily because of United States insistence that all four panel reports be
considered together. [1977] U.S. ExpoRT WKLY. BNA No. 149 at A-3 (March 22,
1977). The United States hopes that by consudering all of the panel reports
together, a framework for negotiation on a broad range of trade problems can be
set. It is feared that a singular consideration of the finding .on the DISC system
could undermine the United States' bargaining position. See Letter from David C.
Garfield, Chairman of the Special Committee for U.S. Exports, to all U.S. Senators
on the tax advantages of retaining tax benefits for DISCs, the text of which is
reprinted id. at P-1.
